Wei Jingsheng Foundation News and Article Release Issue: A185-W90



Release Date: February 12, 2006



Topic: Forecast of Development in China in Year 2006 -- by Wei Jingsheng

标题:2006年中国发展方向 -- 魏京生


Original Language Version: Chinese (Chinese version at the end)



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Forecast of Development in China in Year 2006

-- by Wei Jingsheng



Previously, I focused on analyzing trends in China last year and some fundamental conflicts in Chinese society.  My conclusion was that the distortion of the economic structure and the imbalance of development have aggravated social and political conflicts.  The primarily class-based social conflicts have pushed Chinese society to the brink of collapse.  The intensification of conflicts in China, as well as the reality of the political structure not being enough to resolve the conflicts, has motivated the Chinese Communist ruling faction, with Hu Jintao at the helm, to use a war against an outside region in an effort to resolve internal conflicts.  To stir up international disputes and to actively prepare to launch a war against an outside region was the primary distinguishing feature of the foreign policy of Hu Jintao's faction last year.     


Hu immediately changed the Jiang Zemin Era tactic of using intimidation of empty threat as a negotiating tactic.  In the past two years, Hu Jintao's policy toward Taiwan has been to openly threaten to use force, along with drawing the Taiwan's divergent opposition party factions to his side.  The first piece in the first move in their game of chess is for Hu to break the tradition and pass the "Anti-Secession Constitutional Law", turning empty threats into operations to be implemented and for the sake of setting a legal foundation for a possible surprise attack in the future.  It also gives the dove faction in Taiwan a reason to oppose Taiwanese independence and to be close to the Mainland.  The second piece in this move - having Lian Zhan and Song Chuyu visit the Mainland and to work together - they successfully disintegrated the mentality of resistance among the Taiwanese people, and caused public opinion to waver between surrendering and resisting.  The Taiwanese people's desire to rely on the West to maintain their independence and sovereignty has declined greatly, and is now at the lowest point of the last half-century.  This chess move had unexpected success. 


Hu Jintao's second chess move in foreign relations was to re-open six-party talks on the North Korea nuclear issue.  The purpose of the talks was to bring more attention to North Korea's nuclear blackmail and to increase its effects.  To put it plainly, if your voice isn't loud, you can't scare people.  The results of this chess move - scaring people - that followed was to expand the Sino-U.S. nuclear conflict, which was limited to the Taiwan Strait, to the entire Northeast Asia region, and to force North and South Korea and Japan to be part of the stakes.  This would dampen America's determination to intervene in a war across Taiwan Strait.  Even though Kim Jong-Il is an untrustworthy and outrageous hooligan, he has limited strength.  Be it America or Japan, even alone either one has ample ability to deal with North Korea.  But with a big or one and half big nations lurking in the background, no one dares to make a rash move.  This is the true reason behind Kin Jong-Il's sudden rise in the world.  China pulls Russia together to contend with Japan and America has made Kim Jong-Il even more foolhardy.  This has forced the U.S. to give up the initiative in security matters regarding Northeast Asia and to take up the stance of negotiation and working together with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), putting the America in a disadvantageous position in all matters.        


Considering that Japan's policy on China has, for the last several decades, traditionally been to keep a low profile, Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao's train of thought has been to put more pressure on Japan, forcing it to soften and become a second South Korea.  The disintegration of the alliance between Japan, America, and South Korea will keep America from being able to intervene in a war across Taiwan Strait.  With victory in a war against Taiwan, China can establish hegemony in the West Pacific Ocean and even in the Indian Ocean, and America's power in this region will fade.  Such a great achievement will increase Hu Jintao's prestige, thus giving him the ability to crush factional disputes in his party; it will make Hu Jintao into a new dictator and a Hu Jintao Era that can stand side by side with that of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping.  Yet what caused Hu Jintao regrets is that after he stirred up conflicts with Taiwan, Japan's reaction wasn't as weak as he expected, and Wu Yi's lack of proper diplomatic etiquette, along with the wave of anti-Japanese sentiment in China, didn't have the effects in Japan that they expected it to have.  The Japanese people expressed an out-of-character toughness and supported Koizumi's unprecedented tough attitude toward China.  Through its war bill and approving the expansion of its navy and air force, Japan showed that it would play the important role of America's partner in Northeast Asia.  A Japan that could only stutter when facing China has from now on become a part of history.  Moreover, this is something completely forced out by China's Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing's erroneous diplomatic behavior.  This is just like moving a stone onto your foot and breaking it.    


The fourth most important part of Hu Jintao's new diplomatic thinking has been in operation for three years.  It is his plan to have the European Union lift its arms embargo on China, and it has the support of French President Jacques Chirac and former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder.  The purpose of this plan is to effectively divide America and the European Union, isolating America.  In addition, if China faces a naval blockade, it can obtain goods from Europe through Eurasia.  This plan started in the Mao Zedong Era, and actually was not suspended during the Deng Xiaoping Era.  It's just that only until the Hu Jintao Era did China use a specific implementation strategy with lifting the E.U.'s arms embargo as the breakthrough point.  Li Zhaoxing's assumptions were that with the lure of $50-$60 billion US dollars in aircraft and nuclear power contracts, France and Germany would actively work on it.  With the tide of anti-American sentiment in Europe, lifting a prohibition that's not very practical would seem to be like shooting fish in a barrel for China. 


Who would have thought that their boat would have capsized upon crossing such a small brook?  When the CCP was still secretly lobbying Europe, some European politicians with consciences notified me in a timely manner.  Immediately after, the overseas Chinese democracy movement and both European and American politicians promptly launched initiatives to combat the lobbying.  They destroyed the plans of the mouthpieces of Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao, and French and German corporations.  First they delayed the E.U.'s vote, then, with the help of the "Anti-Secession Law", put off the vote indefinitely.  At the same time, it made people in countries all over Europe start paying attention to Hu Jintao's war scheme.  In this diplomatic protest to protect peace, a portion of our friends from the overseas Chinese democracy movement and part of Falun Gong friends worked together, and were able to guide international politics.  And the concrete actions of politicians in European countries and America to uphold justice played a decisive role.  It seems like when Hu Jintao went to Europe last year he had already made a final evaluation, and had decided to abandon this sure-to-fail plan and to start implementing a new plan.  


After running into walls in Japan and Europe, what will be the direction of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao's new war-based diplomacy thinking?  What new tricks will they come up with?  After looking back at the situation in China of the past year, everyone may be more focused on what situations will come in the future, so each person can plan his actions and achieve his goals.  Below I will help my friends to analyze a little more some of the major trends to come.


On the economic side, the growth rate next year will definitely drop.  For the past fifteen years, the two pillars of China's economic growth have been the drive of foreign trade and exports and foreign investments filling supply deficiencies.  Looking at the situation last year, China didn't relax its restrictions on trade with Europe and America.  According to Wen Jiabao's thought pattern, developed over decades as a national cadre, relaxing import restrictions is an action that will cause losses, and because of internal pressure, he finds it very difficult to do this as well.  This it can be predicted that European and American barriers against Chinese products will become even more sever, and have no chance of being loosened.  It's impossible to maintain a prosperous export situation by merely relying on the RenMinBi not rising.  The entire economy will shrink back, thus triggering a chain reaction.  Only if the RenMinBi rises is there hope to improve internal demands and to lighten the pressure from trade protectionism.  Yet there's no chance that this will have an effect in the short run.  Thus, the development of the Chinese economy in this year and the next year will be relatively difficult.  


In terms of politics, since Hu Jintao's follows a hardliner way of thinking, suppression is still the primary means of governance.  Facing irresolvable trends such as the intensification of resistance and the spread of the grassroots criminal underworld, suppression can only solve problems on the surface.  In an environment where the ranks of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) cadres are concerned only with money, and since there is nothing for them to believe in, no one can forces the bureaucratic capitalist class to lessen their exploitation and mitigate social conflicts.  Democratic governments can claim innocence since their power comes legally from the majority of the people.  Even if a servant steals his master's money, what he can steal is still limited.  When major incidents arise he still has to look after his master's interests.  In an autocracy, it is different.  The pillar of its power is the bureaucratic capitalist class, so how can it not look after its master's interests and instead look after the interests of the people?  Thus one could predict that the political situation in the coming two years will be one of the ruling class further uniting and class struggles further intensifying.  I estimate that Hu Jintao will have to temporarily give up his plan to overpower the Jiang Zemin faction and to establish his authority.  Thus, the Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao system will become a cart drawn by three horses: Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao, and Zeng Qinghong, and internal struggles will lessen.  If the internal struggles lessen, it will indicate that suppression of civil human rights activities and the criminal underworld will intensify.  All sorts of belief groups will be treated as the Boxers or the White Lotus Society and face continuing persecution.  The crisis from the large-scale turmoil that will result from this will be greater than that of the Jiang Zemin Era.  As to this possibility, Hu Jintao can only deal with it by maintaining internal unity and avoiding splits in the ruling clique.  But these are unreliable and temporary ways of maintaining these; it's impossible to fundamentally resolve the class oppositions that come from the gap between the rich and the poor.


Inferring things from the CCP traditional way of thinking, when the Party temporarily faces irresolvable internal difficulties, using wars against foreign powers and mass patriotism to numb the masses and establishing idols and authority are its essential methods to resolving the problems.  This traditional mentality came from Mao Zedong, continued through Deng Xiaoping, and has been passed to Hu Jintao.  Soon after Mao Zedong had established his regime, he fought a war America in Korea, and thus obtained Joseph Stalin's support, as well as established his highest level of power and prestige.  Before this, his inner-Party authority was only relatively high, and he had yet to establish it over the entire society.  Afterwards, after facing Three Years of hardships, Mao's prestige dropped rapidly, as the people felt unsettled.  Mao, without reason, attacked his international ally -- India's Jawaharlal Nehru.  During the Cultural Revolution, he couldn't reach his goals, and during the politically tumultuous 1969, he again, without rhyme or reason, started a small-scale regional war against the Soviet Union.  Yet the war had a major impact internally, and he was able to, in the name of war, adjust his personnel, numb people's hearts, and tide over the unending Cultural Revolution crisis.  In 1979, when Deng Xiaoping had just come to power, he attacked Vietnam, and quickly established his authority. You could call him a "good student of Chairman Mao."  Hu Jintao, as a disciple of the Mao-Deng School, has praised himself as a determined Communist, would have learned the skill of using war to establish authority.  It would be too easy to lure people with something so easy to do.  This would be especially so if the people before Hu had prepared the conditions for this for many years, along with funds and technical assistance from Western corporations. 


Even though Chinese government has faced setbacks in Europe, and Europe has become a dead piece in the chess match, if Chinese government plays its other moves well, it will still have hope.  I estimate that in the Hu-Wen-Zeng diplomacy guided by the principle of preparing for war, they will make their moves around certain focus points.  The two focus points will be the Taiwan-unification war and the North Korea nuclear talks.  Hu is happy of using both carrot and stick in terms of a Taiwan-unification war.  He plans to continue to expand the stakes of the war, and by collaborating with forces from both inside and outside Taiwan, lessen the resources that would be depleted in attacking Taiwan, thus maintaining strength to deal with America.  In their Taiwan Straits war plans, America is the biggest worry.  If they can enable Pan Blue in Taiwan to gain power, then Pan Green will be forced to change its anti-Communist stance, and both sides will fight to kiss up to the Mainland.  This would be the most ideal state, especially if Taiwan gives up without a fight, leaving America helpless to act.  The second good move would be to have the North Korea talks get more and more deadlocked, and North Korea's internal stability would be beneficial for setting up a second battlefield during the Taiwan Strait war.  Negotiations are an effective means to prevent America from suddenly attacking Kim Jong-Il and taking him out of power. 


If America succeeds, the right to take the initiative in the war would transfer over to them; this would increase their persuasion strength.  This is something that Hu must prevent.  Thus I expect the third move of the chess is to for Hu to transfer the business order from Europe to America, in an effort to strength the lobby capacity in America.  I expect America's big corporations and the politicians who support them to receive a fortune, as the price they could pay is initiative in the Asia-Pacific region.  But this is a burden the next American government will have to bear; the current one won't necessarily pay attention.  The fourth move would to be to renew China's Mao Zedong Era policies in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.  In addition to creating problems in America's backyard, before fighting the war and during wartime, China would try her best to control oil supply in the West, fundamentally defeating America and Europe.  Bush's war in Iraq has made China's leaders truly come to understand the importance of oil, as disrupting the oil supply is draining the lifeblood of Western society.  I estimate that in the next few years, fighting for control of oil will gradually become the key project of China's foreign policy and foreign economic activities.  The prologue to the struggle for supremacy is the struggle for oil.  Our friends, you can use this to observe your own affairs so as to not miss this golden opportunity.



(Written on January 20, 2006.  Partially broadcasted by Radio Free Asia.  The Wei Jingsheng Foundation is responsible for the accuracy of this version of the English translation.)



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Wei Jingsheng Foundation News and Article Release Issue: A185-W90



Release Date: February 12, 2006



Topic: Forecast of Development in China in Year 2006 -- by Wei Jingsheng

标题:2006年中国发展方向 -- 魏京生


Original Language Version: Chinese (Chinese version at the end)









-- 魏京生





















以中共的传统思维来推论,在暂时遭遇无法解决的内部困难的时候,利用对外战争和爱国主义热潮来麻痹民众、树立偶像和权威,是解决问题的根本方法。这传统来自于毛泽东,经邓小平隔代传给了胡锦涛。毛泽东在刚刚建立政权时,就在朝鲜和美国打了一仗,换来斯大林的援助,并树立了他的最高权威。在这之前他的权威在党内也只是相对的,在全社会可以说尚未确立。之后,在遭遇三年困难之后,毛的威信急剧下降,时局人心不稳。毛就无缘无故地打了他的国际盟友,印度的尼赫鲁。在文革没能达到他的理想、政局动荡的1969年,他又莫名其妙地对比他强大的苏联发动了一场小规模局部战争,但内部动作很大,以战争的名义调整了人事,麻痹了人心,渡过了无法结束的文革难关。 1979年邓小平一上台就打了越南,迅速树立了权威,可以说是"毛主席的好学生"。胡锦涛作为毛邓的衣钵传人,又自诩为坚定的共产党人,不可能没学到以战立威的绝招。这么容易的事,太诱惑人了。何况有前人准备了多年的条件,以及西方大企业的资金技术援助。













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