Wei Jingsheng Foundation News and Article: A1357-W969



Release Date: February 3, 2021



Topic: Lessons From the Military Coup in Myanmar -- Wei Jingsheng

标题:缅甸军事政变的教训 -- 魏京生


Original Language Version: Chinese (Chinese version at the end)



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Lessons From the Military Coup in Myanmar

-- Wei Jingsheng



Another military coup in Myanmar happened, that shocked the whole world.  It took people a couple of days to react and begin to condemn the coup almost unanimously.  To say almost unanimously is because the response from the Chinese Communist regime seems to be different from the others'.  There is a murderous intention hidden in its mud-mixing expression.  It seems that it knew in advance that this coup would be beneficial to the Communist Party.  Its Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Myanmar right before the coup.


What was the direct cause of this coup?  Some people say that it was due to different political approaches, and some people say it was due to a change in the distribution of interests, but these are correct yet not quite enough.  Different opinions often occur, and the interest distribution also changes.  Are these enough to cause a military coup?  The specious media critics are looking for words and fooling readers without catching the most important points.


The real reason is that after the last democratic election in Burma, the Western capitalists hurriedly lifted the sanctions without resolving the independence of its military.  These capitalists were doing so in order to seize the Burmese market, yet they planted a hidden danger for the democratization of Myanmar.  Of course, Aung San Suu Kyi’s government may have adopted a stance getting closer to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) out of distrust of the West and wanting to step on two boats at the same time.


This included her relying on domestic nationalist ideological trends to boost her own approval rate, so she received the current ultra-high approval rate.  However, Adolf Hitler also has a very high approval rate.  But was that democracy?  The CCP also had a very high approval rate in its early days of coming to power.  This early approval makes the simple minded democrats who are full of thinking of the Communist Party confused.  In fact, democracy is not only elections, but also includes much indispensable content, and the nationalization of the military is part and parcel.


The nationalization of the military is not only a basic condition for a modern democratic regime, but also a necessary condition for modernization even without democracy.  Throughout Chinese history, the nationalization of the military is a decisive condition for the stability of the power of a major country.  Many scholars in the past twenty five hundred years have not understood why Confucius put the boundary between the Spring and Autumn Period (771BC-476BC) and the Warring States Period (476BC-221BC) on the divisions of the Jin Country by three other countries.  Their various reasons were actually of not to the point.


The division of the Jin Country into the other three countries is precisely the boundary between the privatization of the military and the nationalization of the military.  What prevailed in the Spring and Autumn Period was that the army was in the hands of the individual lords.  When a war broke out, the monarch mobilized the army from the lords, and the monarch maintained a balance between the lords in other times.  When the lords’ armies became larger and larger due to mergers, and the monarch was unable to maintain balance, the three countries divided the Jin kingdom.


Since then, the national system has undergone tremendous changes.  The nationalization of the military had alleviated concerns about internal rebellion, and the speed of mergers has been greatly accelerated.  However, the wars in the Warring States Period did not become more frequent.  In the previous Spring and Autumn Period, wars were more frequent.  Of course, the nationalization of the military is not the only factor.  Institutional competition was even more important.  Freeing the slaves and the privatization of the land were also important reasons leading to strengthening competitiveness.


So since the Qin and Han dynasties (221BC-220AC), the nationalization of the military has been an important condition for social stability.  In the subsequent dynasties, apart from being invaded and subjugated by foreign enemies, the privatization of the army led to instability in China and even the destruction of the dynasty.  The most typical one was the Tang Dynasty, but also the Han Dynasty.  The decline of the Tang Dynasty began when the buffer towns of the military became stronger.  The so-called An Lushan Rebellion began with the privatization of the army.


The international community helped Burma solve its election issue.  But the international community, including Aung San Suu Kyi herself, did not solve the problem of privatization of the military.  Can such a democracy be maintained?  Coupled with Aung San Suu Kyi's wrong strategy of trying to “hold the emperor in order to command the princes” (as described in Chinese proverb), and her way of thinking to balance big powers, eventually led to the result of a military coup.  For a democratic government, the people are the emperor.  But for a military dictatorship, the people are trivial grass on the roadside.  In a situation where the army is still privatized and democracy is not yet stable, holding the emperor cannot command the princes, because the princes (of the military) do not approve of “this emperor” (made of people).


On this issue, the CCP is smarter than the Nazis and the Soviet Union.  The Nazis and the Soviet Union both had the Wehrmacht for the country, while the CCP only has the full Schutzstaffel for the party.  The Chinese army is the private army of the Chinese Communist Party.  This is a principle that Mao Zedong and Xi Jinping absolutely adhere to.  In an environment where the basic system of the country is not democratic, speculation about the nationalization of the military will not be accepted by the CCP.  They understand well that if the army ceases to be a private army of the Communist Party, then it will not be far from a military coup against the Communist dictatorship itself.



(This English version is translated by Ciping HUANG, without any compensation.  Wei Jingsheng and the Wei Jingsheng Foundation appreciate her decades of contribution, especially for allowing the use and distribution of her translations of these commentaries.)


Original link of the commentary broadcasted by Radio Free Asia:



To hear Mr. Wei Jingsheng's related commentary, please visit:



(Written and recorded on February 2, 2021.  Broadcasted by Radio Free Asia on February 3, 2021.)



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Wei Jingsheng Foundation News and Article: A1357-W969



Release Date: February 3, 2021



Topic: Lessons From the Military Coup in Myanmar -- Wei Jingsheng

标题:缅甸军事政变的教训 -- 魏京生


Original Language Version: Chinese (Chinese version at the end)









-- 魏京生







































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